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Holding On: A Community Approach to Autonomy in Dementia
Kit Rempalaa, Marley Hornewerb, Joseph Vukova, Rohan Medaa, and Sarah Khana
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Walsh problematizes a dichotomy in medical decision-making for dementia patients: clinical practice
tends to give moral weight to patients’ post-onset preferences, while philosophical literature tends to argue
for the prioritization of advance directives. Walsh refutes the philosophical view in favor of common clinical
practice by considering Dworkin’s endorsement of advance directives as “an effective means of extending an
individual’s autonomy from their current self, as an individual who has decisional capacity, onto their future
self, who lacks it” (Walsh 54). Dworkin proposes that the changing, contradicting, and/or “whimsical”
preferences characteristic of dementia patients do not reflect autonomously established critical interests—and
thus necessitate prioritization of advance directives in medical decision-making. In sum: Dworkin’s view of
autonomy requires both a patient’s ability to form critical interests and that critical interests “show a degree of
stability and resistance to change across time” (58).
Responding to Dworkin’s view, Walsh argues that a patient’s change in preferences throughout the
experience of dementia is insufficient reason to assume post-onset preferences are inauthentic,
nonautonomous, or bear less moral weight. Walsh likens dementia to Paul’s (2016) concept of a cognitive
transformative experience. Given that the transformative experience changes “the way the person thinks
about their preferences, values, and beliefs” (Walsh 2020, 59), Walsh asserts the implications of dementia
“could not be fully considered by someone who is in a process of drawing up an advance directive” (55).
In this commentary, we (i) affirm and elaborate on Walsh’s position using Agnieszka Jaworska’s
(2017) idea that dementia patients—despite having diminished autonomy—are still “valuers” (280) who can
originate and maintain critical interests. We then (ii) introduce Hilde Lindemann Nelson’s (2002) concept of
“holding the individual in personhood” (Nelson 30), to (iii) evaluate Walsh’s account using Nelson’s
framework.
Consider first Jaworska’s account of autonomy, according to which the “potential for autonomy [is
associated] primarily with the capacity to value, and well-being with living in accordance with one’s values”
(276). Being a valuer, according to Jaworska, requires only that the person “thinks he is correct in wanting
what he wants, and achieving what he wants is tied up with his sense of self-worth” (280). By these criteria,
dementia patients are indeed “valuers,” and can maintain partial autonomy through their ability to value.
Jaworska’s account of autonomy thus functions as an alternative to Dworkin’s account that dementia patients’
diminished capability to originate and maintain critical interest deprives them of autonomy.
Likewise, for Jaworska, critical interests need not require a profound sense of what it means to live a
good life as a whole, but merely opinions about what is good and how to live well (278-9). Jaworska states,
“anyone who has a conception of himself, a set of ideals that he wants to live up to and in virtue of which he
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assesses his own value, is no doubt a valuer” (280). On this view, even if dementia undermines previous,
more complex interests, the values those interests entailed may survive as simpler, reconfigured critical
interests which deserve equal moral consideration (278). Here, Jaworska’s account supports Walsh’s,
according to whom transformative experiences may drastically alter patients’ preferences/critical interests, but
do not necessarily discount their stability and validity (Walsh 2020).
In agreement with Walsh, we posit that while dementia unarguably compromises the patient’s
autonomy, this does not mean it is in the patient’s best interests to disregard whatever autonomy remains in
favor of deference to a previously-drafted advanced directive. Moreover, in agreement with Jaworska, we
posit that the reason for such lies in the fact that the advance directive may not reflect the patient’s current
critical interests as a valuer.
But where to go from here? In the remainder of this commentary, we build on Walsh’s and
Jaworska’s accounts by advocating for a medical decision-making process that emphasizes and supplements
dementia patients’ remaining autonomy via community engagement. By understanding autonomy as a
community effort, we support the central idea behind both Walsh’s and Jaworska’s accounts: “To properly
respect the autonomy of many an Alzheimer’s patient, one must do quite a bit to enhance his autonomy. One
must help the person no longer able to do so on his own lead his life according to his remaining values, to the
extent that this is still feasible” (Jaworska 288).
Consider Hilde Lindemann Nelson’s (2002) concept of “holding the individual in personhood”
(Nelson 30). On Nelson’s account, family/caregivers can construct or maintain “a personal identity for [a
person] when she cannot, or can no longer, do it for herself” (30). Nelson develops her view with an eye to
cases like vegetative states, anencephalic infants, and Alzheimer’s patients. Applied to cases of dementia,
Nelson’s view implies that dementia patients’ autonomy can be “held in place” via community-constituted
efforts, which would adequately nullify necessary deference to advance directives.
For Nelson, personhood—as made possible through mutual recognition of and response to narrative
identity—is important because identities “stand surrogate for how those who bear them may be treated” (31).
Patients who experience dementia-instigated narrative discontinuity, such as Walsh’s account of Wendy
Mitchell describing her pre- and post-dementia selves as separate people (Walsh 2020), are thus at risk of
being regarded as incomplete persons. It is precisely this fact that often motivates deferring to advance
directives which were written in a state of more complete personhood. Nelson’s account of personhood,
however, provides the foundation for the morally superior alternative defended by Walsh and Jaworska.
Nelson’s account shows how a community can bolster an individual’s diminished personhood. More
particularly, a communal recognition of an individual’s “changing procession of sensations, emotions, beliefs,
attitudes, wishes, misgivings, and other mental states,” and care providers’ acting in accordance with these
preferences/values, can serve to supplement an individual’s identity (34). Nelson’s account of personhood
thus grounds Jaworska’s view that to be a valuer does not require narrative continuity or a “sense of one’s life
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as a whole” (278), but only a “confluence between thinking about and acting upon what you say you value
and your emotional life” (283).
Grounding Walsh’s and Jaworska’s accounts on Nelson’s account of “holding individuals in
personhood” also has another implication—one that is brought out by neither Walsh nor Jaworska
themselves. In particular, dementia patients’ emotional capacity to value or convey interests, along with these
other constituting mental states, may not on their own be sufficient for full autonomy. However, within the
framework of a community which (i) establishes common attitudes regarding the individual’s current
preferences/critical interests, (ii) shares a recognition that the individual has “certain rights, [and] is properly
the object of various moral duties” (Nelson 33), and (iii) contributes actions/treatments to the individual’s life
which are in accordance with the individual’s values, we contend a demented individual’s autonomy/ critical
interests can be “held in place” without the need for advance directives. Thinking in this way, then, “rather
than tying personhood solely to capabilities and competencies residing within the individual, we have to see it
as partly also an interpersonal achievement” (34 [emphasis ours]).
By comparison, the upholding of advance directives threatens a form of “holding in place” in which
the preferences of an individual’s pre-transformative-experience identity supersede the preferences of the
post-transformative-experience identity—and doing so undermines the patient’s current values. In the model
we have presented, however, caretakers can supplement/reconstitute dementia patients’ diminished
autonomies and fulfill patients’ critical interests, without sacrificing the patients’ current values or the quality
of their current life experience. We argue that the community-centric approach we advocate here therefore
represents a morally superior alternative to advance directives, as it undermines neither previous nor
remaining autonomy, and does not “hold in place” an identity which no longer fits the demented individual.
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